gestures and looks, and the same action can be meaningless in one culture or an offensive communicative act in another (e.g. spitting at the floor while engaged in a conversation). The challenge for the embodied communication perspective is to identify interpersonal couplings, to identify individual cognitive mechanisms that enable such couplings, and to determine how these different mechanisms get aligned to create shared perceptions, shared references, shared beliefs, and shared intentions. We believe that our attempt to face these challenges should be interesting to a wide interdisciplinary audience ranging from cognitive neuroscientists who are interested in identifying basic mechanisms of social interaction to cognitive scientists and engineers who are interested in modeling the human mind or constructing intelligent machines.
In the following sections we describe the type of research contributions from the different fields and disciplines that set the context for the embodied communication perspective. Such an integrated perspective will, on the one hand, decisively advance our understanding of how primates (especially humans) produce, perceive, and understand bodily gestures and how they utilize such gestures in order to coordinate their actions and exchange symbolic and non-symbolic information (Section 1.2). On the other hand, embodied communication is seen as a research metaphor to foster technology advancement in areas like anthropomorphic human-machine interfaces and artificial humanoid agents, such as virtual humans and humanoid robots. The cognitive modeling challenge is to devise theoretically grounded and empirically guided models that specify how mental processes and embodiment work together in communication (Section 1.3).
Further important input comes from brain research in general, and social neuroscience, in particular. For instance, a large number of empirical findings indicate the crucial role of the motor system during action observation, imitation, and social interaction. Computational neuroscience has started to examine the parallels between the processes involved in controlling bodily actions and understanding observed actions. Moreover, it has been proposed that communicative signals might provide a specific context for the motor commands controlling the body (e.g. forward models predicting the consequences of actions in the context of social interaction; Section 1.4).
Together, the contributions of this book reflect the embodied communication perspective in that communication should no longer be understood simply as an exchange of a series of abstract signals. Rather, it should be seen as a dynamic system of cross-modal attunement, decisively depending on embodiment, and constrained by cultural practices that structure the ways in which people interact, be it verbally or non-
verbally. An outline of the chapters is given in Section 1.5.
Embodied communication in humans and other primates
Language has long been conceived of as an isolable natural object with formal properties that can be investigated independently of communicative events and their participants. Speech has often been looked at merely as "spoken language". However, a more complete and correct picture of human communication may require researchers to include non-verbal communication and its intimate connection to speech in social interaction. A good starting point to achieve this is the embodied cognition perspective that has advanced our understanding of individual cognition by pointing out that it is spread across the mind, the body, and the various artifacts located in the environment movements, gaze, arm and hand movements, distance, spatial orientation, as well as touch (e.g. Heeschen et al. 1980; Grammer et al. 1988) . Cross-linguistic studies have led to further insights about how gestures support speech (e.g. Kita and Özyürek 2003) , and attempts are being made to set up dictionaries of the communicative gestures most frequently used in everyday life (e.g. Müller and Posner 2004) .
The ontogeny of gestures and intentionality are closely connected. Children begin to use gestures between 9 and 12 months of age. Many of these gestures originate from actions performed on objects and become intentional actions about objects (Bates et al. 1975) . As Adamson (1995) (Iverson and Thelen 2000) . Later, children also use gaze to infer word meanings (Baldwin 1991) , and there are a number of developmental changes in pointing gestures that go hand in hand with the development of joint attention (Moore and D'Entremont 2001) .
Gesture has also been extensively studied in non-human primates (e.g. Tomasello et al. 1994 . For instance, chimpanzees extend their arm to beg for food, clap their hands to raise others' attention, and young chimpanzees touch their mother's side to request transport to a different location. Gestures with tactile or auditory components are used independently of where the addressee is looking. In contrast, visual gestures, like "hand-beg", are only used when the recipient is facing the actor. Some apes have learned to use pointing gestures that are not part of their natural behavioral repertoire to request food from humans (e.g. Call and Tomasello 1994; Leavens et al. 1996) . Human-reared apes have also been observed to use pointing gestures to request things other than food (Call and Tomasello 1996) . Furthermore, there seem to be some similarities between apes and human infants in the development of gestural communication (e.g. Tomasello and Camaioni 1997) . It has also been argued (Stephan 1999 (Clark 1996; Allwood 2002 ). The same is true for the linguistic system of sign languages (Liddell 2003; Kita et al. 1998; Duncan 2003) . Conversations are organized not by speech alone, but rather through a dynamic process of interaction. Both speakers and listeners are mutually involved through different forms of embodiment (eye gaze, gesture, posture, facial expression, etc.) in the organization of talk and action.
The distribution of meaning across speech and gesture is sometimes redundant and sometimes complementary (Kendon 1987) . Careful analyses of speech and gesture reveal that language is inseparable from imagery as illustrated by speech-synchronized, coexpressive gestures (Nobe 2000; McNeill and Duncan 2000; McNeill et al. 2002; Duncan 2002a) . Iconic gestures appear to play a vital role in organizing imagistic information about complex scenes into packages that can be verbalized within single speech-production cycles (Kita 2000) . Furthermore, prosodic cues are essential for turntaking and conceptual grounding, as demonstrated in computational models of turntaking that enable real-time predictions in dyadic interactions (Cahn and Brennan 1999; Brennan 2000) . Additional insight into the structure of a conversation comes from analyzing postural mirroring between conversants (Rotondo and Boker 2003) .
Other findings have revealed forms of rhythmic organization for both the production and the perception of utterances. Just as the coordination of rhythmic limb movement (Schö ner and Kelso 1988), speech production and gesturing requires the coordination of a huge number of disparate biological components. When a person speaks, her arms, fingers, and head move in a structured temporal organization (selfsynchrony) (Condon 1986) . The gesture stroke is often marked by a sudden stop that is closely coupled to speech, with temporal regularities observed between stressed syl-lables and accompanying gesture. Moreover, hearers readily pick up the rhythm behind a speaker's utterances (interactional synchrony). The body of a listener, after a short latency following sound onset, entrains to the articulatory structure of a speaker. It has been claimed that there are interpersonal gestural rhythms (McClave 1994) and body movement may be important in interactive communication management (Davis 1982; Jaffe et al. 2001) . Rhythm phenomena have been reported both for speech production (Fant and Kruckenberg 1996; Cummins and Port 1998) and perception (Martin 1972 (Martin , 1979 Pö ppel 1997) . Wachsmuth (2002) has suggested that rhythmic patterns provide an important mechanism in intraindividual and interindividual coordination of multimodal utterances and that the analysis of communicative rhythm could help to improve human-machine interfaces.
Pertaining to the association between body language and affective states, it has been suggested that attitudes such as openness and shyness are expressed through body movement (e.g. Argyle 1988 ). Darwin (1872 Darwin ( /1965 observed long ago, across a far wider range of mammalian species than just the primates, that the facial expressions of conspecifics provide valuable cues to their likely reaction to certain courses of behavior, a rich complex summarized as "emotional state". This work has had enormous impact and continues to do so (Ekman et al. 2003) . Recent studies have suggested that motion carries far more information than the semantic content and that communication can work without involving direct cognitive processing (e.g. Grammer et al. 2002 Grammer et al. , 2003 . In contrast, research on body posture is almost non-existent in non-verbal behavior analysis (see Shockley et al. 2003 , for an exception), partially due to methodological problems (Grammer et al. 1997) .
However, the observations about the crucial role of bodily communication will ultimately have to be put in context with representation and content. For instance, in Glenberg's (1997a, b) approach, a representation is embodied if it is constrained by how one's body can move and how it can manipulate objects. This view seems to be in accordance with the prevailing concept of embodiment in current cognitive science (Feldman 1997; Ballard et al. 1997) , but the assumption of an analogical structure of cognitive representations does not follow from the fact that cognition is somehow constrained by bodily features. A distinction must be made between (1) the idea that cognitive representations are constrained by possible bodily interactions and (2) the hypothesis that these representations are analogically related to properties of the world (Kurthen et al. 2003) . Without assuming the existence of representations that are not directly embodied, the use of knowledge abstracted from direct experience cannot be accounted for (Habel et al. 1997 ).
In conclusion, body movements are an essential part of interactive face-to-face communication, where gestures normally are integrated with speech to form a complex whole (Streeck 2003) . However, the integration of communicative body movements into a perspective that also includes speech and language requires a new understanding of the complex relations that exist between content and expression. This kind of integration is needed as a counterbalance to the traditional view that has emphasized writing over speech, speech over body, and symbolic over iconic and indexical communication (Allwood 2002 ).
Embodied communication in machines
A growing body of work in artificial intelligence, robotics, and agent research takes up questions that can be related to embodied communication in a technical way. From a basic research perspective, these areas can advance our understanding of key aspects of cognition, embodiment, and cognitive processes in communication. From an application perspective, they are positioned to provide well-grounded support to enable "anthropomorphic" interfaces for assistance systems in many application areas. The view that human language crucially depends on embodiment and that this would be a major challenge among many other ones for creating "Intelligent Machinery" was already envisioned by Alan Turing (1948) , in stating: "Of all the above fields the learning of languages would be the most impressive, since it is the most human of these activities.
This field seems however to depend rather too much on sense organs and locomotion to be feasible."
Artificial Intelligence (AI), originally a field of the study of intelligence by computational theories of symbol use (overview see Wachsmuth 2000) , has over the past decade undergone a paradigmatic shift toward the scientific study of embodied artificial agents in artificial life, humanoid robots, and virtual humans. In applied research this shift resulted in new topics of study such as perceptive or anthropomorphic human-machine interfaces and interface agents (e.g. Terada and Nishida 2002) . These efforts are complemented by the novel interface technologies for display and sensing becoming broadly available. These include force and position sensors, miniaturized cameras, touch sensitive or immersive visual displays. The first hardware platforms of humanoid robots have reached the edge of commercial availability, offering a basis for physical assistance systems in home or public environments. Interfaces are about to become less rigid and more integrated and are expected to revolutionize the humantechnology interface that we know today.
The paradigmatic shift in AI also led to new research directions referred to as "Behavior-based AI", "Situated AI", or "Embodied AI". In all of these new directions, agent-environment interaction, rather than disembodied and purely mental problem solving is considered to be the core of cognition and intelligent behavior (e.g. Agre and Chapman 1990; Brooks 1991a, b; Maes 1994; Agre and Rosenschein 1995; Arkin 1998; Pfeifer and Scheier 1999; Pfeifer and Bongard 2006) . The aim is to build artificial agents, which interact with and adapt to new environments, previously unknown to them. Through their embodiment, such agents are continuously coupled to the current real-world situation (i.e. situated). Researchers in embodied AI and behavior-based robotics believe that embodiment and situatedness are also main features of natural intelligent agents and that they could be decisive in solving the problem of how symbols are grounded in sensory, non-symbolic representations (Harnad 1990 ).
This new AI paradigm has also led to new types of models, as in biorobotics, which uses robots to model specific behavioral phenomena observed in animals (Webb 2001) . Models in the field of biorobotics generally work at a neuroethological (or in some cases neurophysiological) level of explanation. Notably, they are empirical, in that artificial neural networks are embodied in robot models that are tested under the same conditions that animals encounter in the real world, for example in the study of gait patterns in locomotion (Dean et al. 1999) or in sensorimotor control (Möller 1999) .
Another modeling approach is to construct robots that illustrate how a behavior observed in natural intelligent agents (e.g. to "learn" or to "imitate") can be
implemented. In such models, the aim is not to reproduce data that has been collected in a controlled environment, but rather to get a detailed understanding of a cognitive ability in a situated and embodied context (e.g. Pfeifer and Scheier 1997; Brooks et al. 1998; Ritter et al. 2003; Rickheit and Wachsmuth 2006) . Demonstrable by robotic appearances of expressive faces, limbs and hands, efforts include the simulation of human-like abilities, such as attention and emotional expression (e.g. Breazeal and Scassellati 1999; Kleinjohann et al. 2003) , imitation of grasping (e.g. Steil et al. 2004) , and the development of protolanguage (Billard 2002; Billard et al. 2004) .
A further important issue in embodied AI is the empirical study of language evolution by way of synthetic modeling approaches with both robotic and simulated agents (Steels 1997a (Steels , 2000 . As Steels and Vogt (1997) argue, robots need to be equipped with at least basic communication abilities in order to move on from agents that can solve basic spatial tasks, such as object avoidance and navigation, towards agents that could be said to exhibit "cognition". These abilities must be developed bottom-up by the agents themselves, and the communicated concepts as well as the means of communication must be grounded in the sensorimotor experiences of the robot (Steels 1997b ). This way, robots can be used to study the origins of language and meaning in self-organization and coevolution (Steels 1998a) . A number of experiments were carried out with robotic and software agents to study the emergence of reference and meaning (Steels 1996a) , lexicon (Steels 1996b (Steels , 1997c , and syntax (Steels 1998b ).
An attempt to study communication in (predesigned, largely controlled) simulated environments is undertaken in virtual humans research. Researchers across a wide range of disciplines have begun to work together toward the goal of building virtual humans (Gratch et al. 2002) -also known as "embodied conversational agents" (Cassell et al. 2000) or "perceptive animated interfaces" (Cole et al. 2003 Kopp et al. 2003) .
By engaging in face-to-face conversation, conveying emotion and personality, and otherwise interacting with the synthetic environment, virtual humans impose fairly severe behavioral requirements on the underlying animation system that must render their virtual bodies. Animation techniques must span a variety of body systems:
locomotion, gestures, hand movements, body pose, faces, eyes, gaze, and speech.
Research in human figure animation has addressed all of these issues (e.g. Badler et al. 1993; Terzopoulos and Waters 1993; Tolani et al. 2000) . But at a more fine-grained level, it is necessary to determine the specific spatial and temporal relations among modalities, with timing emerging as a central concern. For instance, speech-related gestures must closely follow the voice cadence (Cassell et al. 2001; Wachsmuth and Kopp 2002) . First attempts have been made to integrate these multimodal behaviors in computer-animated human models with sufficient articulation and motion generators to effect both gross and subtle movements with visual acceptability and real-time responsiveness . A related technical effort is to assemble software tools and to reach interface standards that will allow researchers to build on each other's work (Gratch et al. 2002) .
A research challenge at the heart of the study of embodied communication is imitation of non-verbal behaviors such as gestures demonstrated by a human interlocutor (Kopp et al. 2004a) . For instance, gestural movements derived from imagistic representations in working memory must be transformed into patterns of control signals executed by motor systems (Kopp et al. 2004b) . Another research challenge is emotion, that is can a virtual human express emotions related to internal parameters that are driven by external and internal events. In communication-driven approaches, a facial expression is deliberately chosen on the basis of its desired impact on the user (e.g.
Poggi and Pelachaud 2000)
. In contrast, simulation-based approaches view emotions as arising from an agent's valenced reaction to events and objects in the light of goals (e.g. Becker et al. 2004) , where the current emotional states of the agent are communicated by consistent facial expression, intonation, and further behavioral parameters.
The realization of synthetic agents engaging in natural dialog has drawn attention to questions on how to model social aspects of conversational behavior in mixedinitiative dialog, in particular, feedback signals and turn-taking, a basic interactive mechanism for scheduling the speaker role in conversation. Whereas conversation analysis has emphasized the context-free and rule-based character of this mechanism (Sacks et al. 1974) , empirical studies by Duncan (1974) Goodwin 1981; Clark 1996) . In this line, the work by Thórisson (1997 Thórisson ( , 1999 Thórisson ( , 2002 ) and
Cassell (Cassell et al. 1998) has paved the way for computational models of turn-taking in human-machine communication.
In summary, the design of human-machine interactions with robotic agents and virtual humans is of great heuristic value in the study of communication because it allows researchers to isolate, implement, and test essential properties of interagent communications. Creating artificial systems that reproduce certain aspects of a natural system can help to understand the internal mechanisms that have led to the particular results. Such modeling should draw both on cognitive and brain research. It should include approaches to simulate behaviors and processes in neuroinformatics as well as artificial intelligence approaches that address a wide range of functions supporting communication, ranging from bodily action to language.
The role of basic social interaction in embodied communication
In the past, there has hardly been any crosstalk between action research and communication research. However, new findings in the domain of social cognition suggest that many primates (including humans) are equipped with basic functions for social interaction that reside in the perception action system. This raises the question of whether more sophisticated forms of verbal communication are grounded in basic sensorimotor loops for social interaction that serve to understand and predict conspecifics' behavior and support basic action coordination.
Ideomotor theories (e.g. Jeannerod 1999; Prinz 1997) claim that the specific actions of others can selectively affect one's own actions, as observed in mimicry (Chartrand and Bargh 1999) , priming (Wegner and Bargh 1998) , and imitation Iacoboni et al. 1999; Prinz and Meltzoff 2002) . According to these theories, actions are coded in terms of the perceptual events resulting from them. Observing an event that regularly resulted from one's own actions induces a tendency to carry out this action. Thus it is assumed that perceiving events produced by others' actions activate the same representational structures that govern one's own planning and control of these actions. Further findings provide evidence that actions at the disposal of another agent are represented and have an impact on one's own actions, even when the task at hand does not require taking the actions of another person into account (Sebanz et al. 2006 (Sebanz et al. , 2003 . These and other results (e.g. Barresi and Moore 1996; Shiffrar and Pinto 2002) suggest that social interactions depend on a close link between perception and action.
Ideomotor theories have gained strong empirical support from neuroscience through the finding of "mirror neurons". These neurons do not only fire when a monkey performs a particular goal-directed action but also when a monkey observe another monkey or the experimenter perform a similar action (Gallese et al. 1996; Rizzolatti and Arbib 1998; Gallese 2003) . action are also active during imitation (Fadiga et al. 1995 (Fadiga et al. , 2002 Iacoboni et al. 1999; . Premotor systems are also activated when subjects view manipulable tools (e.g. Grafton et al. 1997; Weisberg et al. 2007) or action verbs (e.g. Hauk et al. 2004) . The finding of mirror systems suggests that we don't necessarily need conventional sign systems in order to get aligned with others. Mirroring seems to provide a mechanism that allows us to understand others' actions by matching them to our own action repertoire.
Another important mechanism for motor control that could have implications for embodied communication is the real time simulation of action (e.g. Kawato et al. 1987; Miall and Wolpert 1996; Jeannerod 2001; Wolpert and Flanagan 2001) . It is now well established that forward models predict the sensory and perceptual consequences of one's own actions in order to compensate for the time that it takes for the reafferences to arrive in the central nervous systems. More recent is the proposal that others' actions can be predicted using the same forward models that are used to predict the consequences of own actions once the mirror system has established a match between the observed action and one's own action repertoire (Wilson and Knoblich 2005) . Such predictions could ensure that one stays aligned with the actions others will perform during joint action, particularly when precise timing is important Jordan 2002, 2003) . It has also been speculated that similar processes support alignment during verbal discourse (Pickering and Garrod 2007) .
Learning by imitation is another essential part of human motor behavior that could be crucial for embodied communication and seems very limited in other primates, even chimpanzees (Tomasello et al. 2005) . Although seemingly a trivial "copying" task, learning by imitation poses a series of computational challenges including: (i) how to map the perceptual variables (e.g. visual and auditory input) into corresponding motor variables; (ii) how to compensate for the difference in the physical properties and control capability of the demonstrator and imitator; and (iii) how to understand the intention of action from observation of the resulting movements (Schaal et al. 2003) .
This illustrates that, although imitation may use mirroring mechanisms, mirroring is not sufficient to explain imitation. Arbib (2005) to the evolution of a language-ready brain. Wolpert, Doya, and Kawato (2003) have explored the parallels between the computations that occur in motor control and in action observation, imitation, and social interaction. In particular, they have examined the extent to which motor commands acting on the body can be equated with communicative signals acting on other people and suggest that computational solutions evolved for motor control in natural organisms may have been extended to the domain of social interaction.
According to Wolpert and colleagues (2003) social interaction involves that an actor generating motor commands causes communicative signals which, when perceived by another person, can cause changes in their internal states that in turn can lead to actions which are perceived by the actor. The authors suggest that their approach to action understanding provides an efficient mechanism for performing the computations needed in social interaction that may contribute to a theory of mind that is based on difference modeling between one's own and others' internal states. From a philosophical perspective, it has been speculated that observed action, together with the simulation component of action memory, forms a major building block for an understanding of other minds (Proust 2000) . Under a representationalist analysis, this process can be conceived of as an internal, dynamic representation of the intentionalityrelation itself and, once in place, could later function as a building block for social cognition and for a more complex, consciously experienced representation of a firstperson perspective Metzinger and Gallese 2003) . 
Outline of contents
Bringing together a selection of articles from the cognitive and neurosciences as well as the computer sciences, this book aims to develop the new perspective of embodied communication. The 18 chapters to follow focus on several aspects of embodied communication to elaborate a comprehensive understanding of the processes that give rise to the exchange of information by verbal and, in particular, non-verbal means.
The first eight chapters address basic sensorimotor, cognitive, and brain mechanisms that enable the social couplings between humans that are crucial for any form of social interaction and discuss the evolutionary forces behind these mechanisms.
In Chapter 2 "Some boundary conditions on embodied agents sharing a common world", John Barresi defines some general constraints that any embodied agent, human or machine, must meet in order to effectively work together with other agents of the same kind. He starts with the observation that such agents will have personal worlds that are characterized through relations with the environment that embody the agent's purposes (intentional relations). "Common worlds" between agents emerge when their personal worlds overlap or interact. Barresi applies his framework to a number of findings from research on evolution and child development. He also proposes a thought experiment involving a robot community (the "Cyberiad") to illustrate his framework.
He points out that this framework should be understood as an attempt to develop a common language that captures basic principles of social life.
The "wild systems" approach Jerome Scott Jordan proposes in Chapter 3
"Toward a theory of embodied communication" is similarly ambitious. The fundamental assumption here is that organisms need to be understood as systems that survive through energy transformations. In this perspective cognition and communication are conversation. This research is guided by the assumption that there is a continuum between thinking and action and that higher-level cognition is tightly linked to perception and action. One way to test this claim is to look at the temporal alignment of people's body movements and eye movements while they converse. The authors introduce a new method (recurrence analysis) that they have used to study such temporal alignments. The results of their studies make a very strong point for the notion of embodied communication. Hearing each other speak is sufficient to make conversation partners move in a similar rhythm and mutual understanding is improved when their eyes are temporally aligned in scanning the same objects in a scene.
Chapter 5 "The visual perception of dynamic body language", by Maggie Shiffrar, addresses the perceptual processes enabling us to derive cues from movements that support basic forms of emotional and intentional understanding. The human brain is without doubt an organ of a social organism. Maggie Shiffrar shows that visual social information derived from others' movements is indeed processed in a different way as non-social information derived from movements. She further shows that visual processing is affected by the similarity of motion representations in the observer and the observed actor. Thus the human visual system seems not to be a general-purpose processor but an inherently social organ that allows people to read the bodily expression of others with ease in their daily lives.
A look at "mirrors for embodied communication" is taken by Wolfgang Prinz in
Chapter 6. He starts with a discussion of the manifold cultural uses for mirrors: they provide means for people to perceive themselves in new ways and in different perspectives. He then shows how the mirror metaphor can be used to describe mental functions and representations ("mirrors inside") as well as social functions that constrain people's actions ("mirrors outside"), and applies these metaphors to a wide range of phenomena that are of central interest to cognitive scientists and neuroscientists alike. In his view, the mirror metaphor will not only help us to understand how people mimic each other, imitate each other, and engage in joint action.
It also provides a way to explain how people create a sense of self for themselves that "is tantamount to creating a homunculus" within their own body.
In Chapter 7 "The role of the mirror system in embodied communication", Natalie Sebanz and Günther Knoblich discuss which aspects of embodied communication mirroring mechanisms can explain and which aspects they cannot explain.
They start with an overview of the recent empirical evidence from cognitive neuroscience that leaves few doubts that while observing others we "recreate" their actions, emotions, and sensations in our own minds. Mirroring creates a basic social link that helps us to understand others, to predict what they will do next, and to create emotional bonds with them. However, Sebanz and Knoblich also point out that it is important to recognize the limits of mirroring. More sophisticated social interactions that involve imitation, joint attention, joint action, mind reading, or verbal communication require additional cognitive mechanisms. However, it seems likely that these additional mechanisms interact and make use of the powerful mirroring machinery that is already in place in monkeys.
Like the human body, the human mind was shaped by evolutionary constraints Computer simulations of multimodal behavior are an increasingly popular method to test and to refine cognitive models of language production. Chapter 18 "Implementing a non-modular theory of language production in an embodied conversational agent", by Timo Sowa, Stefan Kopp, Susan Duncan, David McNeill, and Ipke Wachsmuth, assesses which aspects of McNeill's Growth Point theory of language production can be implemented in an artificial agent. So far such agents have been largely based on assumptions borrowed from modularist views of speech production.
Focusing on the model architectures of two communicative agents, the authors contrast these views with the assumptions and implications of Growth Point theory and outline how some of these could be modeled computationally. They discuss which communicative advances can be expected for conversational agents that conform to Growth Point theory and, more generally, how predictive computational models of language and gesture production can further the cognitive modeling of multimodal behavior. The authors and the editors hope that this volume will stimulate further discussion and that it will inspire research that further enriches the embodied communication perspective: to identify individual cognitive mechanisms that enable interpersonal couplings and to determine how these different mechanisms get aligned to create shared perceptions, shared references, shared beliefs, and shared intentions. They also hope that the detailed study of modeling issues will lead to novel ideas advancing work on anthropomorphic human-machine interfaces and artificial humanoid agents. 
